Cobden-Chevalier is regarded as the main episode in trade liberalization generating a harmonious period of free trade that compares favorably with the period before 1860s or even with the more recent GATT era. Is it really true that Cobden-Chevalier was the turning point for nineteenth century trade liberalization? The paper analyzes if CobdenChevalier was an exclusive Rich European phenomenon or if it evenly spread trade liberalization around the World. In order to answer these interconnected questions the paper offers a new database covering more than 7,500 data points for an extended group of 23 manufactured products in 11 categories in 38 countries and colonies around the world for selected years during the period 1846-1880. On the one hand, preliminary results show that World Trade liberalization was moving up in the turn of of the second half of the nineteenth century, that is unilateral move towards free trade in Britain did spread trade liberalization after 1846. On the other hand, the so called Cobden-Chevalier Treaty affected mainly rich European countries, but many other countries in the European Periphery were also affected in a more moderate way. Cobden Chevalier was then an exclusively European phenomenon that reinforced previous unilateral liberalization trends, thereby affecting a substantial share of world trade.
generating a harmonious period of free trade that compares favorably with the period before 1860s or even with the more recent GATT era.
Is it really true that Cobden-Chevalier was the turning point for nineteenth century trade liberalization outside Britain? Authors like Sharp (2010) and Federico (2009) have emphasized that actually liberalization following the repeal of the Corn Laws was not exclusive to Britain, and that the movement to lower tariff duties on agricultural products actually started well before 1846. Regarding bilateral cooperation, Pahre (2008) offers an interesting account of liberalizing treaties in Europe that followed the formation of the German Zollverein in 1834, although these were mostly focused on establishing freedom of commerce, i.e., the possibility to trade internationally on more or less equal terms, and reduced discrimination in shipping and related aspects of trading. Recently, Accominotti and Flandreau (2008) have cast doubt on the path-breaking importance of the Anglo-French treaty. They established that trade liberalization, if measured by the crude 'tariff revenue divided by total import value', actually made much more progress before 1860 than was generally believed, while it might have slowed down after 1860. In response to their results, Lampe (2008 Lampe ( , 2009 has highlighted that actually many commodities, especially agricultural goods, which otherwise figure very prominently in the historiography of market integration in the nineteenth century, were almost absent in the treaties, while these managed to abolish prohibitions and lower tariff mostly on manufactured goods, on which tariffs generally by the late 1850s had been much higher than on raw materials and semimanufactures.
However, his story almost exclusively concerns the more or less industrialized European center of the emerging nineteenth century world economy, while observing that US tariffs on manufactured goods clearly went up in the same period.
Given that previous studies mostly refer to agricultural integration or an unclear mix of prohibitive, protective and revenue oriented tariffs as reflected in the "average tariff measure", and to a great deal with periods starting in 1870, the present paper aims to establish a complete picture of the evolution of tariffs for a comprehensive and consistent set of manufactured goods for a wide range of countries covering the whole globe between 1846 and 1880, a period in which industrialization started to spread from Britain to the European continent and elsewhere. Our new database includes more than 7,500 data points for an extended group of 23 manufactured products, grouped in 11 categories, in 38 countries, colonies and dominions for some selected years during the In Section 2, we survey the complex evolution of commercial policy and trade liberalization in different regions of the word before and after the Anglo-French Treaty.
Section 3 presents our evidence on tariffs and prices and explains the sources and the methodology we follow in the construction of our database. Preliminary results on the evolution of tariffs, focusing on their two most important moments, mean and dispersion, are offered in the following two sections.
Preliminary results show that, even excluding Britain, there was significant and geographically extended trade liberalization in the world before Cobden Chevalier, understood as continuing tariff average reduction during the 1850s. Then, Cobden
Chevalier affected a substantial share of world trade reinforcing previous unilateral liberalization trends. Nevertheless, the incidence of treaty-making in the 1860s and early 1870s on manufactures tariffs seems to have been an exclusively European phenomenon, a finding based on solid comparative evidence that advices caution about much of conventional wisdom and general accounts on commercial policy history.
1 Tena's original work uses 16 different sectors. We had to exclude five of them (ships, machinery, chemicals, apparel and bags and sacks of hemp and jute due to either missing prices or inability to code tariffs consistently. This reflects the fact that most of the products included in these categories were relatively unimportant in international trade before 1880.
-WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT WORLD TRADE LIBERALIZATION.
Still the best account of the tariff history of the nineteenth century, as far as manufactured tariffs are concerned, can be found in Bairoch (1989) , aptly summarized in Bairoch (1997, chs. 2 and 3) . Actually, Bairoch's (1997) Irwin (1993, p.94) , following Brown (1958, p.132) , supports the idea that all these efforts failed, and frustration and discouragement set the stage to the unilateral tariff reforms in early 1840s that culminated with the repeal of Corn Laws in 1846. Unilateral free trade conversion in Britain was not complete because, during the 1840s and the 1850s, exotic products imports like tea, tobacco, sugar, coffee, wine and spirits, were still very heavily taxed representing more than half of total British tariff revenue. The same was true for France (see Tena 2007, p. 107) . Furthermore, as Nye (1993 Nye ( , 2007 Kindleberger (1975) .
In a recent provocative paper, Accominotti and Flandreau (2008) According to Bairoch (1989, p. 137) , the British system of colonial trade policy in the nineteenth century should be divided into two periods: before and after 1846-49. In the first period, colonial trade policy was set by a reciprocal preferential system and shipping monopoly between metropolis and the colonies as evidenced by the Indian (Bairoch 1989, p. 110) . Until the 1850s the differences between self-governing colonies and the other colonies were less important. From the end of 1840 onwards, tariffs in self governing colonies were very low -between 2 and 6 per cent -but that policy changed from the mid-1850s in Australia -especially in Victoria that accounted for around 50% of Australian population -but also in Canada,
where there is evidence too of industrial protectionist tariffs being levied in those years (see, Bairoch 1989, pp.148-49) .
Other important semi-independent countries outside Europe like China, Japan, Turkey or Iran shared were subject to the mentioned "enforced commercial liberalism" (Bairoch 1989, p. 155) open commercial policy during the mercantilist era, it was persuaded to sign commercial treaties leading to very low manufacture tariffs in early nineteenth century.
-A NEW DATA BASE ON MANUFACTURES TARIFFS AROUND THE WORLD
Apart from Bairoch's (1997) For the rates reported in the present study, we have achieved full coverage of our 11 commodity groups (see table 1 ) for almost all countries in most of the benchmark years 1846, 1853, 1859, 1863, 1870, 1875 and 1880. Our database also contains data a large amount of data points for years between these benchmark years, but since we could not achieve full coverage of all commodity groups we have not used them at this 2 For the construction of a variable this work has been extended to 15 European countries in Lampe (2011), but the tariff rates have not been published separately.
stage to ensure full comparability of all data points in the tables and graphs given here.
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However, in the future we hope to be able to provide complete time series, a task that basically depends on identifying the date (year) of the modification of all individual tariff rates covered in the benchmark years.
Following the 'britanocentrism' of our sources, the rates we report are for commodities of British manufacture. This is important to notice for the first data point, 1846, when the preferential system for British products in the colonies was still in force, as well as for the period following 1860, when bilateral treaties following CobdenChevalier established 'conventional tariffs' (based on 'tariff conventions', that is, bilateral treaties) in many countries that differed from the 'autonomous tariffs' of the customs legislation that imports from non-treaty partners were subject to. The implicit discrimination has been shown to be an important driving force of the spread of bilateralism after 1860 (Lampe 2011) .
In most places and years, tariffs were imposed as either ad valorem rates or as specific duties even though sometimes they appeared as a combination of both.
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Specific duties were denominated as monetary values for a certain national unit measure of volume, area or weight for which English equivalents were usually provided. 5 Thus the first challenge referred to the conversion of these specific duties into ad valorem equivalents that are comparable across countries and over time. In order to be able to do this, price data was required.
Given the number of products involved, it was impossible to match perfectly specific duties with prices. We used a shortcut then. First, we organized the data into 11
sectors following Tena (2010). 6 These sectors represent the bulk of manufactures traded and span products of different skill intensities. Secondly, we collected the quantities and values of exports from the British trade statistics for the corresponding products or groups from 1854 to 1880. Thirdly, we computed implicit prices (unit values) for all these products (23 in total) and averaged them out within each sector. Fourthly, we extrapolated all price series back to 1846 using Sauerbeck (1886) as shown on Table 1 below. Finally, we divided all specific duties over their respective prices or, whenever missing, over their respective average sector prices. 7 We acknowledge that by applying
British export prices, we bias the ad valorem tariffs upwards. However, these price series offer best relative price estimates compared to the arbitrarily fixed import values used in many official statistics [of underdeveloped countries] at that time. Secondly, we assume that F.O.B/C.I.F. price differential is low for most manufactured products.
Additionally, we face the challenge that some countries, namely Spain and Mexico, imposed prohibitions on entire commodity groups (especially cottons, but also leather), which then would not be included in our estimates of average protection, leading to an estimates of their tariff levels that are biased downward. We have therefore arbitrarily assumed (following Lampe 2011) prohibitions to be equivalent to 1.5 times the highest value in other places (normally Russia or Portugal).
At different points in time, Victoria and New Zealand had duties (or 'registration fees') per cubic foot on several items. We have decided to use British standard transport/stowage conversion rates for light goods of 50 cubic feet to the ton to convert this volume measure into weight (Stevens 1878, p. 31, 303, etc.) . The rates obtained for the eleven individual groups are aggregated countrywise in two ways for presentation: First, we computed unweighted tariff averages out of our sample of 23 manufactured products, following a tradition of the traditional presentations by the Board of Trade (1877 Trade ( , 1905 itself, the League of Nations (1927) and Liepmann (1938) . Secondly, we assume a common demand structure for imports of manufactures in every country equal to the export structure of the main exporter of manufactures. That is, we compute weighted averages of tariffs according to the annual present a second moment, the variance of tariff rates, weighted and unweighted. This is somewhat related to their 'generalized mean and variance of the tariff distribution', which under the assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) trade expenditure function are proportional to the trade-weighted mean and variance of tariffs and can serve to assess the welfare costs of tariffs. But note that we are only looking at manufactures, and that our generalization from the British export structure to every country's import structure might not reflect each country's expenditure function equally well.
As mentioned repeatedly, the database is still under construction, with the ultimate aim of including full time series for the countries covered here as well as other colonies and countries. Nonetheless, it already possesses a wide geographical coverage, encompassing most regions of the world. In total, the database covers 38 countries which were organized into five groups: 'Rich Europeans', 'Poor Europeans', 'New Settlers' (here: US and Argentina), 'Other Latin American Countries', and 'SelfGoverning, Colonies and Protectorates', following an arbitrary but explicit criterion in which the poor were those countries which, in 1870, had a GDP per capita below half that of the richest country in the world (the United Kingdom) in that same year, according to Maddison (2006) . 8 See below how countries were allocated into these five groups.
8 Only one exception has been made. Argentina has been included in the group of rich new settlers (despite its per capita GDP in 1870 is slightly below half UK GDP per capita in the same year, according to Maddison (2006) Giffen (1882, pp. 255-58) . This is the most disaggregated estimation of the geographical division of world demand (including colonies) for the period under study, and a better alternative to the conventional contemporary GDP estimations at least for the case of poor countries. Finally, we computed country group averages according to each country's share of world population. Table 3 shows for which country we have full data in which of our seven benchmark years (1846, 1853, 1859, 1863, 1870, 1875, 1880) . Only these countries are included in the country group averages for the respective year. Therefore, although the database demanded a massive amount of data input and covers many manufactured product groups, some regions are still underrepresented in some benchmark years. The resulting database already comprises more than 7,500 data points. As will be shown in the next sections, this database improves our understanding on trade liberalization during the second half of the nineteenth century. It increases the number of manufactured products, the geographical scope and the number of years covered.
More importantly still, it reveals much more than we knew about tariff protection in the nineteenth century. First, we can compute tariff averages for country groups, for countries, for sectors for all these benchmark years. Secondly, the methodology here also allows us to disentangle the factors that drove the evolution of tariffs: price changes or cut/increase in specific duties. So far, authors have neglected the fact that, in the nineteenth century, tariffs were usually defined as specific duties denominated in national currencies. Therefore, changes in prices may have caused important effects on the level of protection that are not captured by changes in tariff policies (i.e., movements in the specific duty per se). All in all, our database permits an evaluation of tariff protection around the globe from 1846 to 1880, thereby highlighting the possible effects of Cobden-Chevalier, or their absence.
-HOW MUCH TRADE LIBERALIZATION HAPPENED IN THE WORLD?
The Appendix shows our set of national tariffs on manufacturing products from 1846 to 1880. These tariffs were computed as the unweighted average of tariffs as defined in the previous section (Table A. 2). One shortcoming of unweighted averages might be that they skew our estimates towards sectors that are actually less prominent in overall or each country's trade expenditure. As explained in the previous section, the solution was to compute national weighted average tariffs for all these years, based on the share of the trade of these sectors in the annual structure of British exports. These weighted estimates can be found in Table A Although national histories of tariff protection are extremely interesting -and we surely cannot confirm Bairoch's (1989, pp. 19-20) idea of Portugal being a free trader, they are outside the scope of our work. The idea here is to draw general trends of tariff protection by looking at country groups as defined in the previous section (weighted by their share in world imports). (30.7%) in 1859 to 10.5% (14.3%) in 1863 and 9.3% (12.0%) in 1870. We can also see that there was a trend for the dismantling of high tariff barriers underway before since at least 1846, which was shared by the European periphery and the poor independent countries of Latin America, and to a certain extent by the New Settlers, where the impact of the less protectionist US tariff of 1847 is overstated in the picture here by the inclusion of Argentina (the customs tariff of Buenos Aires) in 1859, which howeveralthough we cannot provide real figures -also underwent a liberalization in the 1850s.
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The impact of Cobden-Chevalier in the European periphery was, however, much smaller and limited to some countries (mostly in Scandinavia, Austria, the Italian States, and -late -Spain), of which some did not liberalize so much as a consequence of treaties, but through unilateral reforms (especially Spain), while Portugal, Russia and Greece followed the tide only reluctantly or not at all. Also, while the European periphery "liberalized" before and after 1860, the actual levels remained on average much higher (in 1859: weighted 31.6% unweighted 40.6%, in 1870 24.0%/27.3%) than in the European core, actually more similar to the European core's level in 1859.
However, the Scandinavian countries changed from a more peripheral to a more core pattern over time with weighted average tariffs of 8.9% in Norway, and 14.7% in Sweden in 1870. Italy (10.6%) also followed a similar pattern (see Federico and Tena 1998) . Our data also shows the European reversal of liberalization in late 1870s, as a result of national industrialization strategies, this time more pronounced in the poorer periphery than in the richer core. Since most nineteenth-century tariffs were specific duties denominated in national currencies, it is important to investigate if tariff protection changed over time because of conscious decisions of governments to modify these specific duties or if this process was more the result of constant duties and changing prices. 11 Apparently, looking at 10 Morocco shows averages of 16 to 32% before 1860, which are caused by a specific rate on iron that leads to an ad valorem equivalent that is much higher than the otherwise 10% rule (71% in 1846 to 160% in 1859). We are currently examining what was the reason for this higher rate and whether we can confirm it from other sources, and what happened to this rate after 1859, when we rely on the 1881 report by Giffen who only reports the uniform 10% rate from 1860/61 to 1880. 11 We used specific duties in British pounds as the sources did not provide data in national currencies for all years and countries. Therefore, we cannot disentangle the effect of changes in the exchange rate as a source of protection or liberalization during this period. Sources: see Appendix for underlying data. 60% set as maximum for display purposes. Unweighted average of commodity-trade weighted averages for each country.
One aspect where prices mattered somewhat were textiles. Figures 4 shows the comparative evolution of the cotton manufacture price index constructed from prices used in our data base versus the well-known Sauerbeck price index for textiles. Both indices are identical between 1846 and 1854, as we comment in previous section, because we have used Sauerbeck's textiles evolution to move our cotton manufacture price index in these years. In general, the movement of both indices is very similar also from 1854 onwards: Price peaks in 1857 and the reduction of prices from 1864 to 1870 are both coincident with the increase and moderation of textile tariff shown in Figure 5, where we see the ad valorem equivalents of textile tariffs in current and constant (1860) prices. We can see that a part of the unexpected liberalization trend in the 1850s, especially until 1857, is partially influenced by the upward trend in prices of textiles. This fits very well with the conventional accounts of commercial policy history for
Europe before the outbreak of Cobden-Chevalier bilateralism.
Textile tariffs are also important in their own interest, since textiles were at the heart of trade expansion during this period. It is interesting to see how tariff protection on these products changed (see Figure 5 ). Textiles are equivalent to the classification of 'unskilled manufactures' in Tena (2010), for which we maintain the terminology here.
The database on textile tariffs is very rich as the British Board of Trade was especially keen on showing textile tariff barrier in foreign countries. Therefore, we have a rich collection of tariffs for yarns and manufactured textiles of wool, flax (linens), and cotton. Rich countries usually registered lower tariffs for textiles than for other products, especially at the beginning of our period, presumably because they exported textiles themselves. We can thus advance that the liberalization effect was especially focused on reducing tariffs on textiles: the pattern of liberalization was indeed led by textiles. In the European Periphery, we see exactly the opposite: although the pattern of liberalization was the same for textiles and the other manufacturing products, textiles were usually taxed more heavily, during the first benchmark years, when prohibitions especially regarding cottons were important in some countries and prohibitive tariffs were imposed in others, but also after Cobden-Chevalier, and its extensions, which had a more reduced effect than in the Rich European core. For the New Settlers, we see that textiles were taxed more or less at the same rate as the rest of products before and after
Cobden-Chevalier, reflecting a more even structure of protection. Latin American preCobden-Chevalier liberalization was led by textiles during the 1850's and the first part of the 1860's. We have no data for many countries in later periods, but our limited evidence shows a return to protection at some point during those years for most of the countries, as the data for high textile duties in 1875 and 1880 indicate.
From our results here, we can infer that Cobden-Chevalier was an exclusively that of richer countries. It also reflects the differences in levels between the unweighted and weighted figures that can be seen in Figures 1 and 2 . Until 1870, levels fell to 21% (Fig. 5a ) or 26% (Fig. 5b) if weighted by trade and 19% (Fig. 5a ) or 24% (Fig. 5b) if weighted by population. Up to 1880 we see a slight increase by 3 to 5 percentage points in the trade weighted and by 2 to 4 percentage points in the population weighted sample.
What can we say about the other moment of protection, the dispersion in rates across commodity groups (see Tables A.4 (2007) general moments -consistently also should have the highest welfare costs of tariffs. However, this might follow directly from the fact that populations with higher mean generally have higher variances. We have therefore also calculated unweighted and weighted coefficients of variation, dividing the square root of the variance by the mean. We tentatively interpret these as indicating a simultaneous movement in welfare costs from levels and dispersion of tariffs if they remain constant over time (rates and dispersion increased or decreases simultaneously), while an increase means indicates increasing dispersion relative to the rates and a decrease the contrary.
We see that, first of all, at all points in time, European countries, rich and poor(er), seem to pursue a much more active trade policy in the sense that the dispersion between their rates is well higher than that of the rest in our sample, 12 This pattern is reflected in the fact, that outside Europe (also in the US and Argentina, the New Settlers) relatively uniform ad valorem rates across commodity groups are much more common than in Europe, where detailed schemes of specific duties prevailed. The extreme in this case are several of the 'somehow dependent' countries in our group 5, which shows the lowest mean, variance and coefficient of variation of tariff rates across commodities, since there tariff schemes consisted of uniform 'flat rate tariffs' with very few exceptions. 
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
Preliminary results show that there was significant tariff liberalization in manufactures around the world before Cobden-Chevalier, if we understand that as reducing average tariffs since the abolition of the Corn Laws, or even earlier points in time. We assume, following literature, a stable duty-free regime for manufactures imports in Britain, and we prove that there was significant tariff liberalization in some of its colonies and protectorates, and in the poor and rich Continental Europe. We have observed tariff reduction from the end of 1840s to the end of the 1850s in most of the countries of the European periphery, including partial abolition of prohibitions. This process might have followed the British repeal of 1846 and Cobden's European travels afterwards (see e.g. Kindleberger 1975 ), but it might also have been part of a more general process of tariff reduction initiated before the abolition of the Corn Laws, a dismantling of the mercantilist policies of the eighteenth century since 1815 or 1820.
Liberalization previous to the Anglo-French treaty of 1860 seems particularly relevant both for Rich European countries and the poor world, but to very different levels. The poor world here excludes the overseas colonies, protectorates and semi-independent countries that enjoined an "enforced liberalism" more or less stable from the 1830's or 1840's to the end of our period.
Cobden-Chevalier was important for the reduction of manufacture tariffs in the world because it was most pronounced in, although possibly limited to, the rich European countries that altogether represented more than 35% of world trade demand.
The treaty wave of the 1860s and early 1870s also influenced tariff barriers in some parts the European periphery, a region that represented around 18% of world imports.
Nevertheless, although the Anglo-French treaty spread tariff reduction exclusively within Europe, it impacted around half of world trade (excluding Britain). Independent poor countries outside Europe, colonies and protectorates were not directly influenced by Cobden-Chevalier liberalization in peripheral Europe was a moderate process because tariffs were coming from very high levels and were still on average (unweighted) around 24% compared with about 9% for the rich European countries in the 1870s. In rich New Settlers, especially the USA, and in poor independent countries, like Latin America, we found some evidence of a liberalization trend until the late 1850s, including the US tariff of 1857,, but that trend reversed in the 1860s and 1870s, leaving these country groups unaffected by Cobden-Chevalier, at least if rates of protection are referred to. High trade tax dependence and other internal policy domestic forces made their tariff levels higher and impervious from the European commercial policy trends. Moreover, as these countries represented some 15% of world trade, their impact on the world tariff -if weighted by trade -was small. Finally, at the onset of the Cobden-Chevalier era, colonies and protectorates already had very low tariff barriers that may have kept untouched throughout most of the period here, although we see an increase in protection from the 1860s in some parts, mostly those British colonies that gained increased self-governance and cautiously followed a path between the general New Settlers and Poor Independent Country patterns and British commercial liberalism.
This new wider perspective on the evolution of tariffs on manufactured products around mid-nineteenth century qualifies the conventional wisdom on the importance of Cobden-Chevalier for trade protection. Both Accominotti-Flandreau (2008) and Lampe focused their attention on rich European countries, with Lampe (2011) explicitly stating that the same factors that can explain the spread of European bilateralism after CobdenChevalier also serve to assess why the network did not spread beyond the European periphery.
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This paper offers a new wider perspective and some qualification on the evolution of worldwide tariff levels on manufactures from 1846 to 1880. Our view on unilateral liberalization is more optimistic than conventional wisdom and we think that an extension of this data base would allow us to develop a more complete research agenda on two different paths. First, connecting our benchmark years to achieve time series with yearly frequency by tracking legislative changes between our benchmark years would allow us to conduct solid econometric analysis into causal relations between liberalization (especially manufactures) and trade expansion in different regions of the World, thereby deepening the existing literature on the effects of tariffs on trade. Second, the extension of the present data series until (at least) the First World War, developing country differences in tariff structure bias to study both the extent of pre-1914 'globalization backlash' beyond agricultural goods that dominate the discussion there, and the consequences of protection and free trade in manufactured goods on the long-run growth performance from the repeal of the Corn Laws (and the death of Friedrich List, both in 1846) for economic growth and industrialization in the long run. In addition to this agenda on the 'supply side' of protection, we also plan to look at the 'demand side', that is the political economy of tariffs, to see whether international differences in tariff levels, and their eventual consequences for national growth records, can be linked to systematic determinants of protection or free trade. 13 Accominotti and Flandreau's dataset contains a number of non-European countries, but they mainly serve as control group for the treaty-making European core. 
